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Decisions 
Vítor H. Silva1 & Eduardo Simões2
When appraising the ethicality of another person’s decision, individuals tend to 
take the valence of the consequences as a basis for their judgment. Specifically, an 
ethically dubious decision tends to be more acceptable when the consequences are 
displayed as positive. This paper discusses the results of observation of the effect of 
accountability to unknown third parties on this process. Results from an experimental 
study (N=251) indicate that individuals under process accountability tend to be more 
severe in their judgment of the acceptability of other’s ethically dubious decisions 
than the non-accountable ones and those who are under outcome accountability, 
but only when the decision’s consequences are displayed as positive or neutral. This 
effect does not occur when the consequences of the decision are seen as negative. 
In this case, people tend to consider the decision ethically unacceptable, regardless 
of whether or not they’re held accountable to unknown constituents. These ten-
dencies are independent of the individual differences in the propensity to make 
cognitive effort in problem analysis. Results are discussed from the perspective of 
decision making in organizations, and their possible relevance to the establishment 
of mechanisms to increase the scrutiny of the ethicality of decisions.
KEY-WORDS: ethical decision-making, accountability, need for cognition
The current global economic crisis, preceded by numerous scandals at formerly 
renowned financial institutions, has demonstrated the failure of many legal measu-
res unleashed in response to cases that, in the early years of the new millennium, 
had involved companies like Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, among others. Legal texts such 
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States, or the Loi sur la Sécurité Financière 
in France don't seem to have been effective in the prevention of behavior ethical 
failings. Even the establishment of specific “ethical infrastructures” (Tenbrunsel, 
Smith-Crowe & Umphress, 2003) in organizations, such as the codes of conduct, 
does not seem to be enough to ensure ethical integrity of organizations. 
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Public leaders and decision makers tend to consider ethical problems in organiza-
tions as reflecting the action of some "bad apples" that would be urgent to stop 
and punish. So, in this view, ethical failures are characteristics of some specific 
individuals or groups. Consequently, many normative efforts to ensure ethicality 
in organizations seem to be rooted in the belief that controlling it is to refine the 
requirements that prevent the emergence of such behaviors. 
Until recently, in psychological research, the dominant view on individual ethical 
decision making portrayed the individual as a conscious decision maker, and aware 
of all possibilities of moral choices. Regarded as reference in the field (e.g., Jones, 
1991; McDevitt, Giappone & Tromley, 2007), the model of Rest (1986,1994) built on 
the work of Kolhberg (Kolhberg & Kramer, 1969; Kolhberg, 1976) on the cognitive 
basis of moral judgments, conceives the decision process as a succession of four 
phases: (1) the decision maker recognizes the moral issue, (2) develops a moral 
judgment, (3) puts the moral aspects of other aspects of setting up a moral intent 
and (4) acts on this moral intent.
However, in the last two decades, accumulated evidences point to the idea that 
“good” people can also do “bad” things (De Cremer, 2009), i.e., most unethical 
behavior is out of conscious control, and may even conflict with the moral 
standards of the individual. This approach suggests that although people con-
sider themselves more ethical than the average (Epley & Dunning, 2000) their 
decisions on ethical issues are systematically biased by self-interest (Banaji, 
Bazerman & Chugh, 2003). It follows that ethical failures are not characteristic 
of particular groups of individuals, and understanding their nature and causes 
require examining how people interpret and acknowledge situations in which 
these problems occur. On the other hand, unethical abuses exist in a web of 
social relations in which the judgment of others reinforces, discourages or ignores 
these behaviors. Social context factors, as the nature of the organizational reward 
system (Jessen, 2003; Locke, 2001) or the goal-setting process (e.g., Ordóñez, 
Schweitzer, Galinsky & Bazerman, 2009), appear to enhance the individual 
propensity to (not) recognize ethical problems and conflicts of interest when 
people are faced with the need to make decisions which involve ethical dubious 
issues. Organizational features, e.g., the punishment or the tacit acceptation of 
unethical behavior, frame individual choices in working settings and indicate to 
individuals the informal norms regarding ethicality in the workplace (Treviño, 
Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006; Tenbrunsel et al., 2003). 
When individuals observe and judge the ethicality of others´ decisions, how ratio-
nal and accurate are they? From a rational - normative perspective, evaluating 
the ethical quality of someone’s decision should be independent of random and 
external factors associated to the decision making process. But, previous research 
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has shown that we are affected, in a biased way, by the decision outcome to 
determine the perception of “moral intensity” of the ethical issues (Jones, 1991), 
which, in turn, seems to assign the wrongdoer’s blame and whether he or she 
deserves punishment (Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999). 
As thinking and deciding about the ethicality of decisions and behaviors of other 
people seems to be based on superficial information and stimulus, it may be 
reasonable to ask if thinking in a more deeply and logical way could lead us to 
more accurate inferences. 
In this paper, we deal with ethical meta-decision making, i.e., we focus the way 
individuals make judgments about the ethical quality of others’ decisions, as 
well as the effects of some contextual and individual factors on this process. 
Specifically, we are interested in exploring the effects of accountability to third 
parties as a possible debiasing factor in the judgment of ethicality of others’ 
decisions, through an increase of individual’s cognitive effort. On the other hand, 
we tested the possible moderating effect of the individual intrinsic motivation 
to process information in a deep and systematic way. 
Information processing in ethical decision-making
Dual information processing models revisited
People do not always make decisions based on clear criteria and preferences, 
and don’t analyze carefully the available alternatives, as advocated by the 
rational choice models of decision-making (Kahneman, 2003). On the contrary, 
in most cases, individuals use inferences which they’ve made on the basis of 
their interpretation of the world (e.g., Higgins & Bargh, 1987). Thus, sometimes 
individuals seek to follow logical procedures, explicit and conscious, but on 
the other hand, they often adopt intuitive and automatic processes, and /or 
based on emotion (Stanovich & West, 2000; Kahneman, 2003; Bazerman & 
Moore, 2009). This type of cognitive functioning, which relies on the use of 
heuristics, i.e., decision rules of thumb or simplified strategies of information 
processing. Although heuristic information processing is in general adaptive, 
it often generates biases in judgment and puts into question the quality of 
decisions. 
This assumption that individuals can process information by using two ways in 
cognitive operations (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Wilson, Lindsey 
& Schooler, 2000) is the core statement of the dual processing models. For ins-
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tance, the heuristic-systematic model (Chen & Chaiken, 1999) suggests that when 
people are not motivated or are limited to think about the content of a problem, 
they pursue a heuristic processing which reflects a less cognitive effort. On the 
contrary, when people are motivated to analyze a topic in a logical and systematic 
way and, moreover, have prior skills and information to do so, they tend to focus 
on content and structure of the problem. The way individuals choose to process 
information, systematically or through a heuristic approach, seems to be influenced 
by personal and contextual variables.
Individual differences may interfere with the choice of one or another way of 
processing the information. Specifically, individuals are more or less driven by 
the need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), which reflects the motivatio-
nal disposition to seek knowledge independently of the characteristics of the 
situation and information. Lower or higher levels of need for cognition seem to 
predispose people respectively to the use of heuristics, adopting a less systematic 
cognitive functioning, or to expend effort in order to understand the problem 
in depth and with a high degree of accuracy. Put another way, individuals with 
higher need for cognition tend to focus on the core aspects of the problem, while 
those with low need for cognition direct their attention to “peripheral elements 
associated with the problem” (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, p. 128).
The motivation to ensure accuracy in information processing, epistemic or 
nondirectional motivation, may not be the sole motive to promote systema-
tic thinking. The individual may be driven by directional motivation, i.e., for 
other motives than accuracy, as the desire to appear to be competent, moral 
or successful. Given this motivational involvement, even when analyzing the 
information in a systematic way, the individual may focus on irrelevant infor-
mation, conditioning the quality of the judgment. This is because individuals 
do not deal with all situations equally. They may wish to get information and 
knowledge on some issues to the detriment of others (Kruglanski & Webster, 
1996). Hence, these motivational orientations not only determine the amount 
of information analyzed but also how it is processed by the individual. As 
Kunda (1999) points out, “even when we are motivated to reach a particular 
conclusion, we are also motivated to be rational and to construct a justification 
(emphasis added) for our desired conclusion that would persuade a dispas-
sionate observer” (p. 224). This means, first of all, that directional motivation 
does not exempt the gathering of enough information and evidence. Secondly, 
the social insertion of a cognitive act (social rules, relationships, etc.) formats 
the outcome under the form of justification before others. Thus, some social 
context factors may have a de-biasing effect in the way people usually analyze 
information when judging other’s decisions on ethical issues. Accountability 
may be one of these factors.
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Accountability
An individual is held accountable when she/he has the expectation, implicit or 
explicit, that may have to justify her/ his beliefs, feelings and actions to others. 
Involves the need to present appropriate and satisfactory justifications for their 
actions, under penalty of negative consequences (Tetlock & Levi, 1980; Tetlock, 
1983; 1999). Thus, accountability is activated whenever there’s an expectation 
that someone’s behavior is under observation and evaluation by an audience, 
who may or may not be known (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). 
Individuals may be asked to account for the way they made a decision (process 
accountability) or for the decision’s outcome (outcome accountability). Decision 
makers who are accountable for outcomes tend to adopt self-justifying patterns 
of thought and a high tendency to commit themselves to past actions (Simonson 
& Staw, 1992.). Differently, under process accountability, individuals tend to engage 
in preemptive self-criticism, leading to more unbiased evaluation of decision 
alternatives (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1992) when compared to outcome 
accountability condition. Moreover, individuals who are accountable for process 
show more consistency in the way they make judgments (Ashton, 1992) and feel 
encouraged to use analytic thinking modes over large amounts of information 
(Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996). In turn, outcome accountability is characterized by 
a cognitive investment in the justification of results and a constant adjustment 
to meet the expectations of constituents.
Ethical decision-making
Ethical decision-making can also be accomplished through two distinct pathways: 
through systematic, conscious, careful and detailed analysis of available information 
or instead it is based on a type of fast, unintentional, and unconscious cognitive 
functioning characterized by recurrent use of heuristics (e.g., Bargh, 1994). For 
this reason, decisions on ethical issues suffer often from problems of accuracy as 
the individual tends to be moved by the perception of what is socially accepted 
as ethical or unethical (Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005). Additionally, the more 
ethically complex is the matter concerned, the greater the amount of information 
that the decision maker has to process, enabling the influence of factors which 
promote the occurrence of errors in judgment. 
Reflecting this tendency for considering more probable that people often use a 
heuristic information processing in evaluating the decisions’ ethics, the influential 
social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001) suggests that moral assessment is based, as 
a rule, in “moral intuitions”, i.e., emotions and automatic responses to stimuli with 
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moral relevance. The explicit moral judgments would be rationalized explanations 
of these emotional reactions.
Therefore, in ethical decision-making, individuals are affected by particular social 
motivations. Specifically, the perception that the consequences of their actions will 
be under the judgment of others may activate the pursuit of ethically acceptable 
solutions. In fact, when decision involves ethical consequences for self and others, 
decision maker tends to be motivated by the perception of what is socially accepted 
as ethical by including a self-oriented motivation in the process (Chugh et al., 2005), 
whereas the consequences are seen not only desirable but also morally justified (Epley 
& Caruso, 2004). It is an “illusion of objectivity” (Chugh et al., 2005), due to the fact 
that individuals tend to perceive themselves more ethical than the others (Tenbrunsel 
& Messick, 2004). On the other hand, the difficulty of imagining the consequences 
of a decision can lead to a biased risk perception of the decision since people tend 
to think of a prospective manner (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982) that is, to 
establish the probability of a given result to happen as the result of a decision. 
In short, as heuristic processing may lead to biases in common decision-making, 
likewise, in ethical decisions, the motivational processes may interfere with the 
analysis of available information, and originate unintentional biases. Therefore, many 
processes of individual decision making on ethical issues can be seen as a particular 
case of bounded rationality, re-named “bounded ethicality” (Chugh et al., 2005).
Judging the ethicality of other people’s decisions
When judging the ethicality of a decision made by others, people tend to take 
the valence (positive, negative or neutral) of its consequences as a basis for their 
judgment (Gino, Moore, & Bazerman, 2008). This seems to be a specific instance 
of the outcome bias (Baron & Hershey, 1988), i.e., the tendency of individuals to 
consider the information on the consequences of an action as a determinant in 
assessing the quality of decision-making or the competence of the decision maker, 
if it is a judgment about a decision made by others. Additionally, (Fischhoff, 1975) 
describes the “prospective bias”, i.e., the use of inferences about the information 
supposedly held by the decision maker before the decision was made. Under 
this biased perception, individuals are prone to use a “flat” time framing: they 
evaluate the quality of the decision on the basis of outcome information that 
was not available earlier to the decision makers (Clarkson, Emby, & Watt, 2002). 
The outcome bias affects not only the judgment about the decision’s quality, but 
also about the decision maker’s competence, to the extent that he or she was 
supposed to have anticipated the consequences. 
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When facing a decision of dubious ethics, people tend to see it as less ethically 
acceptable when its consequences are negative rather than positive. From a rational 
point of view, the judgment concerning a process of decision making requires the 
use of the same information as the decision maker would have available at the 
time of his or her decision (Bazerman & Moore, 2009), but the assumption that 
the consequences are determinants for the assessment of a decision’s quality is 
based on the adoption of a heuristic processing of the information which focus 
the attention on arguments that could turn the decision in “good” or “bad” and 
not in the previous aspects to decision making itself. So, given the inability to 
predict the consequences of their actions, individuals tend to underestimate how 
the decision-making process is conducted, assuming implicitly that the outcome 
determines the acceptability of a decision. In sum, individuals ultimately are judged 
not for a supposed intrinsic ethicality of their actions, but for the consequences 
of such actions, even if they have been the product of uncontrollable factors. 
This tendency to focus on decision’s consequences implies the attribution of 
responsibility to the decision maker for the effects of her action. The perception 
of causality and intention lead individuals to attempts to reestablish a sense of 
justice (Tostain & Lebreuilly, 2008), considering acceptable to punish someone 
in proportion to the severity of the consequences they are responsible for, since 
it’s supposed that it constitutes a clear indication of the degree of negligence 
of the decision maker (Baron & Hershey, 1988). As an example of this kind of 
bias, Alicke and Davis (1989) reported that, in a study presenting a scenario 
in which the owner of a house shoots over a suspected intruder, participants 
attributed more responsibility to the owner when the intruder was presented 
as an innocent victim and less responsibility when the intruder was described 
as a dangerous criminal.
Regarding decisions on ethical issues, Haidt (2001) has shown that negative 
consequences cause strong moral disapproval. Recent research also suggests 
that the outcome bias is a socially relevant heuristic (Agrawal & Maheswaran, 
2005), implying that individuals are motivated to manage the social impact 
of their decision on the basis of intuition about its social acceptability. On the 
other hand, the need for assigning blame and punishment is dominant and 
automatic, providing a source of irrationality of ethical judgments. People are 
driven by the “belief in a just world” (Lerner, 1980) i.e., they believe that the 
consequences of a decision reflect the intention and the personal characte-
ristics of the decision maker. When consequences are negative, the individual 
has information that the impact of the decision have damaging repercussions 
for others, then assumes that it is a socially unacceptable and reprehensible 
behavior (Mazzocco, Alicke & Davis, 2004), judging more severely the decision 
and its author (Alicke & Davis, 1989).
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A study on the effects of accountability on ethical metadecision
Recent research indicates that the promotion of more reflexive contexts in ethical 
decision-making may facilitate the reduction the effect of the outcome bias (Gino 
et al., 2008). On the other hand, as we have seen, individuals under outcome 
accountability are subject to similar biases to those that occur in individuals 
who are not accountable (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999), but process accountability 
appear to have a debiasing potential and tend to foster cognitive complexity in 
the analysis of problems.
So, we expected that individuals under process accountability were able to 
think deeply and recognize the presence of conflicts between intuitive ethics, on 
which their ethical judgments usually rely (Haidt & Joseph, 2004), and the need 
to generate decisions to safeguard their social identity to eyes of the unknown 
constituents to whom they are accountable. In particular, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: When judging the acceptability of an ethically questionable decision, 
individuals under process accountability will be less influenced by the valence of 
the consequences (positive, negative and neutral) than those participants who 
are not accountable or under outcome accountability.
However, contextual factors like accountability to others are not the sole possi-
ble debiasing influences in ethical meta-decision. As we’ve previously discussed, 
individuals may vary in regard to the propensity to analyze information in a 
systematic and deep way.
Considering those individual differences in intrinsic epistemic motivation, we 
predict that:
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between process accountability and judgment on 
the acceptability of a questionable ethical decision is moderated by individual 
level of need for cognition.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Two hundred and fifty-one students (average age is 29.9 years, SD = 10.3, and 82.1% 
are female) from four universities participated voluntarily in this study. 
Participants were distributed over three distinct conditions of accountability and 
through three different types of consequences generated by an ethical decision-
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making. Specifically, participants believed they would have to justify how they 
made the decision (process accountability) or believed they would have to provide 
justifications for the outcome of their decision (outcome accountability). In the 
control group, participants were not held accountable for the experimental task. 
Concerning decision’s consequences, and depending on the experimental con-
dition, participants received one of three versions of a scenario adapted from 
Gino and colleagues (2008) describing the ethically questionable behavior of an 
auditor, each one with different information about the valence of the decision’s 
consequences: positive, negative or neutral (the description of scenarios can be 
found in Appendix A)
Table 1. Distribution of participants by experimental conditions
Valence of decision’s  
consequences
Accountability
No Process Outcome
Positive N = 25 N = 34 N = 31
Negative N = 21 N = 31 N = 28
Neutral N = 28 N = 25 N = 28
Variables and measures
Accountability
The experimental manipulation of accountability has been conducted through 
instructions in the protocol of data collection in order to lead participants to believe 
that they would later participate in an interview with another researcher to gather 
additional data about how they had made their decision (process accountability) 
or about the decision’s justification (outcome accountability). Participants were 
asked to provide an e-mail address in order to be called for an interview. They 
were given a sheet of paper with the title “notes to the interview,” where partici-
pants could take notes considered relevant to the putative interview. Participants 
included in the control group were only informed that they were taking part in 
a study about decision-making.
Acceptability of ethical decision
The observation of the degree to which participants considered the auditor’s 
decision acceptable was operationalized through the question “To what extent 
is the auditor’s decision acceptable?” Seven point Likert-type scale has been used 
(1 = not acceptable and 7 = totally acceptable). 
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Need for cognition
As hypothetical moderator variable, the extent to which participants had higher 
or lower intrinsic motivation to engage in careful information processing was 
assessed using the Need for Cognition Scale (original reduced version) (Cacioppo, 
Petty & Kao, 1984) translated into Portuguese by Silva & Garcia-Marques (2006). 
Participants responded to 18 items (for example, “I like to have responsibility for 
handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.”) using a five point Likert-type 
scale (1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree). The highest scores indicated 
highest level of need for cognition (α .80).
Results
Participants were asked to indicate whether or not (1 = yes; 2 = no) they were 
accountable to others for the decision process (outcome). All participants answered 
in line with the manipulation.
We used participants’ ratings of ethical acceptability as dependent variable in a 
two-way ANOVA in which valence of decision’s consequences and experimental 
condition and served as between-subjects factor. Results show a main effect 
of the valence of decision’s consequences, indicating that individual ratings 
about ethical acceptability are affected by outcome bias F(2, 242) = 22.19, p 
< .001, η2 = .15, even when participants are under accountability. However, 
there are some experimental conditions which could be less biased by the 
outcome decisions F(2, 242) = 14.61, p < .001, η2 = .10, showing that under 
specific conditions, decision context could affect how participants evaluate 
decision ethicality.
Taken together, the valence (positive, negative or neutral) of the decision’s 
consequences and accountability both influence ethical acceptability of the 
decision, indicating the presence of an interaction effect F(4, 242) = 2.62, p 
= .03, ηp2  = .04. So, we undertook and analysis of this effect by conducting a 
posteriori comparison tests (L-matrix) in order to identify which combinations 
were responsible for that.
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Figure 1 shows the means and standard deviations of decision’s ethical acceptability. 
Results show that, process accountability may have a debiasing effect in the 
way participants analyze information about ethical decisions. In fact, face to 
positive consequences, participants under process accountability judge ethical 
decision as less acceptable (M = 2.18; SD = 1.42) than participants under outcome 
accountability (M = 2.94; SD = 1.29) F(1,242) = 8.29, p = .004, or than participants 
under no accountability condition (M = 3.04; SD = 1.21) F(1,242) = 9.54, p = .002. 
In same vein, participants under process accountability, judge ethical decisions 
with neutral consequences as less acceptable (M = 1.44; SD = .71) than participants 
under outcome accountability (M = 2.39; SD = 1.28) F(1, 242) = 10.65, p = .001, or 
than participants under no accountability condition (M = 2.93; SD = .98) F(1, 242) 
= 25.99, p < .001.
However, this situation only occurs when the decision consequences are positive. 
In fact, there are no differences between accountability conditions if the valence 
of decision consequences is negative.
In order to observe the moderator role of the individual level of need for cog-
nition we performed a two-way ANOVA (experimental conditions x individual 
level of need for cognition) with participants’ ratings of ethical acceptability as 
dependent variable. Results show no interaction affect from this variable, F(16, 
223) = .82, p = .65, ηp2  = .05.
Discussion and Conclusions
Consistently with the results of Gino et al. (2008), all participants tended to 
consider the decision with positive consequences as more acceptable than the 
very same decision, but with negative consequences, revealing that the valence 
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of consequences influences the ethical decision process. Apparently, the outcome 
bias is more robust when the individual is confronted with negative consequences 
indicating that these ones render non acceptable the ethically dubious decision, 
or by salience either by recognizing that it is a socially unacceptable situation.
The absence of significant differences between the group of non-accountable 
participants and the group of participants held accountable for the decision’s 
outcome seems to support the idea that usually in ethical decision making there 
is a focus on analyzing the consequences, rather than getting a global view of 
the problem. 
Regardless of the condition of negative consequences, and supporting hypothesis 
1, participants under process accountability evaluated decisions with positive or 
neutral consequences as less acceptable compared with the group of participants 
who are not accountable at all or who are under outcome accountability. This effect 
is independent of the individual propensity to make cognitive effort in problem 
analysis. Moreover, these results suggest that process accountability activates a 
kind of cognitive functioning based on a more thorough and systematic analysis 
of all elements of the decision and therefore less based on the valence of the 
consequences. On the contrary, our results suggests that outcome accountability 
is not an effective mechanism in preventing bias driven by the excessive salience 
of a decision’s consequences, at least, in the case of ethical decision-making. 
However, when individuals believe that they have to account for the way they 
judge the ethical decisions of others (process accountability) tend to make more 
severe judgments, even if the consequences of the decision are displayed as 
positive. This effect does not occur when individuals are facing a similar decision 
but with negative consequences. Under this condition, both accountable and 
non-accountable participants tend to judge the decision as unacceptable. Put 
another way, process accountability seems not to interfere with the judgments 
about the decision when it has negative consequences. This result may be due to 
the high salience of negative consequences (Mazzocco et al., 2004), which allows 
the individual to identify how the decision specifically affects others, leading to 
higher culpability of whom perpetrate an ethically questionable behavior (Alicke 
& Davis, 1989). Participants may anticipate that other people would never accept 
such behavior. Moreover, from a self-centered perspective, individuals may place 
themselves in the victims’ shoes, which implicitly suggest that they themselves 
could be affected by the decision’s consequences.
Taken together, the results of this study may have some relevance for ethics of 
organizational decision-making. In fact, they suggest that when individuals are 
accountable for the way they decide in situations with questionable ethical boun-
daries, they tend to look more closely at all the elements of the problem to the 
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detriment of an exclusive focus on consequences when these are referred as positive. 
As accountability is a permanent feature in organizational life, it seems feasible and 
advantageous for preserving ethics in decision making to focus accountability on 
the justification of the processes rather than the outcomes of decisions. 
On the other hand, regardless of the effects of accountability, and because indi-
viduals tend to emphasize negative consequences to support ethical judgments, 
pre-decisional analysis of decisions’ consequences may foster ethicality. A possible 
obstacle to this precautionary analysis may be that executives tend to over-rely 
on intuition than on intentional deliberation due to various time pressures and 
demanding goals (Chugh, 2004). But, from our results, organizational decision 
makers should go beyond the discussion of expected positive consequences, as 
usual, and should take time to systematically anticipate the possible negative 
consequences of the various scenarios in order to increase the quality of scrutiny 
of the decision-making processes, especially those related to situations which 
may potentiate ethically dubious decisions.
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O Impacto da Responsabilização nos Julgamentos sobre Decisões Éticas 
Quando apreciam o carácter ético de uma decisão de outrem, as pessoas tendem 
a tomar a natureza das consequências como base para o seu julgamento. Especi-
ficamente, uma decisão eticamente dúbia tende a ser mais aceitável quando as 
consequências são apresentadas como positivas. O presente estudo apresenta e 
discute os resultados da observação do efeito da condição de responsabilização 
(prestação de contas a terceiros) sobre este processo, indicando que os indivíduos 
responsabilizados pela forma como julgam a aceitabilidade de decisões eticamente 
dúbias tendem a ser mais severos nas suas apreciações quando as consequências 
são positivas ou neutras. Este efeito não ocorre quando as consequências da decisão 
são apresentadas como negativas. Neste caso, as pessoas tendem a considerar a 
decisão eticamente inaceitável, independentemente de estarem ou não responsa-
bilizadas perante constituintes desconhecidos. Estas tendências são independentes 
das diferenças individuais na propensão para fazer esforço cognitivo na análise de 
problemas. Finalmente, os resultados são discutidos na perspectiva da tomada de 
decisão em contexto organizacional, sendo salientada a sua possível relevância 
para o estabelecimento de mecanismos que permitam o incremento do escrutínio 
da natureza ética das decisões.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: decisão ética, responsabilização, necessidade de cognição
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Appendix A: Scenarios used in the study
Positive Consequences
An auditor is examining reports of a bank.
This bank in addition to the audit services is also an important client of other consulting 
services from the auditor’s company.
During the process, the auditor becomes aware that some accounting practices are prob-
ably illegal. However, before reporting to the customer, she decides to study some similar 
cases to assess whether it really is facing an illegal situation or not.
The auditor discusses the matter with the client who, in turn, assures that there is noth-
ing wrong with their accounting. The client also threatens to end the business relation-
ship with this company audit if the auditor hampers the approval of accounts.
Faced with this threat, the auditor agrees to pass up this situation for a year.
At the end of the fiscal year, There has been no problem with bank accounts.
Negative Consequences 
An auditor is examining reports of a bank.
This bank in addition to the audit services is also an important client of other consulting 
services from the auditor’s company.
During the process, the auditor becomes aware that some accounting practices are prob-
ably illegal. However, before reporting to the customer, she decides to study some similar 
cases to assess whether it really is facing an illegal situation or not.
The auditor discusses the matter with the client who, in turn, assures that there is noth-
ing wrong with their accounting. The client also threatens to end the business relation-
ship with this company audit if the auditor hampers the approval of accounts.
Faced with this threat, the auditor agrees to pass up this situation for a year.
Six months later, it turns out that the client has committed fraud and the bank goes 
bankrupt. 
This situation is related to the practices that the auditor has detected. As a consequence, 
1,400 people lose their jobs and bank customers are unable to recover their savings.
Neutral Consequences 
An auditor is examining reports of a bank.
This bank in addition to the audit services is also an important client of other consulting 
services from the auditor’s company.
During the process, the auditor becomes aware that some accounting practices are prob-
ably illegal. However, before reporting to the customer, she decides to study some similar 
cases to assess whether it really is facing an illegal situation or not.
The auditor discusses the matter with the client who, in turn, assures that there is noth-
ing wrong with their accounting. The client also threatens to end the business relation-
ship with this company audit if the auditor hampers the approval of accounts.
Faced with this threat, the auditor agrees to pass up this situation for a year.
